Ethiopia Is Officially At War Ft. Mike DeAngelo From Critical Threats

Ladies and gentlemen, good morning, good evening, good afternoon, whenever and wherever you're listening to us from. This is the Due South podcast with me, your host, Wilfred Waimiri. And if I sound a little raspy today, forgive me, I am dealing with a horrible cold, but this is a special situation that has necessitated an entire emergency podcast.

If you've read the title, you know who my guest is. He's Sufa Bim, one of our go-to guests whenever we have an emergency in the Horn of Africa, and it seems like we're having one every single month.

So I'm going to kick it to my good friend, Michael D'Angelo from the Critical Threat Project to briefly introduce himself and briefly talk about a situation in Ethiopia before we go into more specifics about just how big of a crisis we're facing right now.

Mike, tell us the people. Thank you for having me again, Wilfred. It's always a pleasure.

Although, of course, I wish it was under better circumstances. Yeah, so for the audience, my name is Mike D'Angelo. I'm an Africa analyst at the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.

It's a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, and I focus there on the Horn of Africa mostly. So basically, to start things off with how the war broke out and how it's going. So last week on the night of, it was September 23rd, the TPLF seized the three main airports in Tigray region.

And, you know, these were basically the last federal Ethiopian federal government strongholds in the part of Tigray that the TPLF controlled. So TPLF effectively consolidate control of Tigray with the exception, of course, of some dispute areas in Western Tigray and Southern Tigray.

And then from there, the TPLF and now allied rebel forces launched an offensive on multiple axes around the Tigray regional border.

So we have fighting going on the eastern axis in the Afar region. And then we also have fighting going on the southern axis and around Amhar region. But the fighting there has also been concentrated in Tigray as well.

And then there have been reports of limited fighting in Western Tigray, too. We have consolidating control of a specific part of Tigray and then launching offensive with rebel forces on multiple axes. And we can talk about, you know, whether that's been successful so far, as well as the Ethiopian military response.

But that's where we're at right now. All right, Mike, let's start on the battlefield since that's where we make our bread and butter by analyzing what's happening on the battlefield. So you mentioned that the TPNF began the offensive by seizing control of the airports within the Tigray region, these three airports, right?

So talk us through what happened because when you hear that a rebel group has seized control of an airport and that it was a government-controlled stronghold, even if it was an enclave within a broader rebel-controlled area, you imagine gunfire, you imagine lots of battles, you imagine lots of bloodshed, but that wasn't the case. Talk us through this.

So the TPLF launched this offensive, or I guess we'll call it an operation as part of a water drill offensive.

They launched the operation to seize the airports in Mekele, which is the Tigray regional capital, Shir, and Aksum, which, again, those are two other primary cities within Tigray on September 22nd, and it went into September 23rd as well.

And as you hinted at, there really wasn't extended fighting between the TPLF and the federal government forces who were stationed at the airport.

My understanding of it is that it was mostly federal police forces and that the generally speaking, there wasn't any extended fighting that the TPLF launched this operation pretty quickly and simultaneously across these three airports and was able to seize them without resistance from the federal forces.

I've seen reports that the Tigrayan forces captured some of these federal forces. I have not been able to verify that, though, but it would make sense. But yeah, seemingly the federal forces sense that they were outnumbered and yet did not really resist the TPLF takeover there.

And in terms of like the implications of this or what it means, why it's important. So as I said earlier, it's about the TPLF consolidating control of the Tigray region. And basically the airports were the only strongholds that the Ethiopian federal government had left in that main TPLF control part of Tigray.

And they really had a lot of symbolic significance as well as practical significance. But the symbolic significance is that under the Pretoria peace agreement, the federal government, you know, has control of the airports. You know, TPLF agreed to let the federal government have control of the airports as well as other key infrastructure.

So now that I mean, the peace agreement was already null and void. But it's just, you know, another, you know, example of how of how that agreement is now null and void.

And yeah, in terms of practical significance, of course, the federal government now cannot use those airports for any military operations would integrate, although their ability to do so anyway, you know, who knows, the TPLF might have had sufficient air defenses.

But that's, that's the significance of them. capturing those airports.

All right, so the situation at the airport for me was really weird, because so for our audience who might not be as familiar with the situation in Ethiopia as you and I, the TPLF executed something of a power drop in May earlier this year, where they elbowed, excuse me, where they elbowed out the former government, which was led by Lieutenant-General Ferdese

Obede.

And Obede is a very interesting character.

We'll come back to him a little bit later. He was the guy who was basically the commander-in-chief of Tigrayan forces during the first Tigray War, 2020-2022. So he's been put out, and he was replaced by a regional council that's chaired by Debatson Gaba-Michael, who was the chairperson of the TPLF, and he also led the Tigray region during the war.

So he was basically the quote-unquote president or governor of the Tigray region during its war with Addis Ababa.

So the fact that they announced themselves, they announced the beginning of the war with this really symbolic attack when there were better targets, more suited for military action, that for me was surprising because, yes, it does give them a quick, easy victory, something that will be plastered all over global headlines in a matter of minutes.

But at the same time, it's such a small story that when you really look at it just seems weird.

So for me, it was a weird story. But the main combat action on that day, the 23rd of September, was between the TPLF and Ogogumo forces. Ogogumo is the rebellion within the Afar region, fighting against the Tigray peace forces.

Just for audience, although the TPLF and the, you know, the Tigray People Liberation Front or something along those lines. I am sorry, my, yeah, Tigray People Liberation Front, my cold medicine. It's really hard to know, but the TPLF and the TPF, both having Tigray in their name, they are not allies at any point.

The TPF is allied with the government, while the TPLF, is obviously in rebellion with the government. So the two sides, with the TPLF aided by Ogogumo forces, the Afar forces, they were fighting along the border between Afar and Tigray region. So Mike, what do we know of these clashes?

What were the biggest battlefield movements in those first days of the war? And I have seen a lot of reports basically saying the Ethiopian government was able to really push back the rebel forces along most of the, most of these early battles. So what do we know?

I would classify the eastern axis or we'll call it the Afar region as being really the only place so far where these rebel forces have had any kind of success, if you will. But again, still been limited success. Their most significant gains have come in the Afar region.

So there's been reports that they've advanced in multiple scattered places across the Afar regional border. None of them being too significant, but there's one in particular that actually is significant. So the rebel forces were able to quickly capture Abala, which is a district capital in Afar, just about 30 miles east of Mekeles.

And then since they've captured Abala, this was on, you know, September 23rd or September 24th. Since they captured Abala, the forces have been able to, or the rebel forces, they've been able to further push east and take Eurebte, which is, you know, another important, important town.

And the reason why these towns are important is because they lie along a highway that connects down to the Afar regional capital, which lies on a highway that's known as the Eseo-Djiboutian Highway.

So it's the main highway that connects Ethiopia and Djibouti, which is, of course, important because Ethiopia relies on it as, you may see, it's only supported by the supply corridor. It relies on that route for a very large majority of its trade.

So the rebel forces have been able to push along a secondary road in Afar that eventually connects to that main highway, although I will say that they have very long ways to go before they get, you know, to the main Ethiopian-Djiboutian Highway.

So let's talk about Djibouti for a moment because, you know, Djibouti is one of the countries that provides Ethiopia with access to the sea and for its troubles, for providing Ethiopia with access to the sea, Djibouti gets paid about $1.5 to $2 billion from the Ethiopian government.

So, you know, this is money it really needs because it only makes about $5 billion in foreign trade in general. So your $2 billion is a massive, massive chunk of that.

And we're looking at a situation where the TPLF and its allies want to basically cut off Djibouti and Ethiopia, you know, from being able to trade, from being able to access each other. Are we looking at a situation where if that happens, Djibouti would intervene on the side of the government, on the side of the Ethiopian government? I think it's possible.

I think it's possible because as you said, this would negatively affect Djibouti as well. So yeah, I think it's possible. But I do just want to say though that it would take a much more significant advance for those rebel forces to get down to the point where they are disrupting the Taliban.

They are still very far away. And the closer they get to the highway, I think it's safe to assume that the more resistance that they're going to face from the federal forces. But just going back to your question, yes, if Djibouti feels as if its revenues from the Ethiopian trade were going to be affected by these rebel movements, I think it's possible.

They could get involved. All right, so let's game out a scenario where the involvement of Djibouti does actually happen.

Let's start with how many more towns would the TPLF and its allies need to capture before it actually becomes enough of a threat for Djibouti to take it seriously and for the amount of resistance they're facing from federal government forces to significantly increase and try and slow them down because from what I'm seeing in the eastern axis, in their bar

Region, the rebel forces have been able to go from strength to strength, you know, racking up victories along this significant highway.

One thing I want to stress is I don't think the rebel forces want Djibouti to get involved, and I also don't think Djibouti wants to get involved. So I think that's an important thing to note.

So, for example, say the rebel forces, even though I think it's unlikely right now, but say the rebel forces were able to get down to the Djibouti highway right around the Afar regional capital, Samara.

If they were able to get down there and then were to further advance east toward the Djibouti regional border or the Djibouti national border, then you could see, I suppose, a situation in which Djibouti use it as an immediate threat.

Another scenario would be if the rebel forces completely cut off any trade moving along that highway, in which case, again, Djibouti might feel compelled to get involved to get things back on track in that regard.

But at the same time, the rebel forces, I think the last thing they want are a Horn of Africa coalition or these other neighboring countries getting involved on the side of the Ethiopian federal government.

They already have their hands full with the Ethiopian military itself. And on Djibouti's side of things, they're dealing with the fallout of the ongoing Red Sea crisis, and they're having thousands of migrants, coming from Yemen as well. So they have other concerns as well.

So I don't think they feel compelled to get involved either, unless it becomes this immediate threat to them. Alright, so I'm interested in something that you just mentioned.

The internal situation within Djibouti, dealing with a crisis of migrants, dealing with a crisis in the Red Sea, how much of an issue is the Djibouti government dealing with as we're speaking?

I don't have the official numbers in front of me in terms of how many people, how many Yemenis have tried crossing the Red Sea into Djibouti. I believe in numbers in the thousands. So, of course, for a country like Djibouti that's already small and resource constrained, getting a sudden influx of refugees, of course, puts a lot of stress upon the government.

So, I think that if the crisis were to continue and if there were even more refugees, then that would be a significant problem for the Djiboutian government. All right. So, let's leave Djibouti.

Let's leave the Afar-Eastern axis of this conflict. Let's talk about what's happening. Within the Tigray region itself, we have seen reports of the Ethiopian National Army, the ENTF, making significant progress within the Tigray region.

Some of these reports, we obviously haven't had confirmation of, but there have been significant reports. Mike, take us through this.

I think that the southern axis, which is the axis that we're talking about here, basically on the border with Tigray and Amhara regions south of Mekele, I think that this is the most important axis so far because it's the one there is, much of the fighting is happening on the A2 highway, which is this main highway that basically runs through Amhara region

From Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa is the Ethiopian capital, all the way up to Mekele.

So it's a very main road in Ethiopia and a lot of the fighting is happening along this front. And what you saw initially was the TPL in coordination with the Amhara Fano National Movement versus another rebel force that's part of this emerging rebel alliance.

They announced an offensive to push south along the A2 highway towards Woldia, which is an important crossroads town in the northeastern Amhara region.

And at the same time, you also have seen operations mainly by the Fano forces, the AFNMs, west of northwest of Woldia. It's not a different road. It's off of the A2 highway around certain towns like Lalivella, for example.

And then additionally, you saw fighting around Sakoda, which is another town that's basically directly west of the Tigray regional border in Amhara region. And initially, you saw these rebel forces take that town.

However, since the early days or the first two or three days of this conflict, the Ethiopian military has been able to not only halt the rebel advance along this axis, but they've been able to repel it, essentially.

You still have fighting around Lali Delas, and I don't think that's going to change. But you saw the Ethiopian military regain control of Sakoda, which again, as I said, is just directly west of the Tigray regional border. It lies off of this main highway.

But more importantly, you've seen the Ethiopian military push north from our region back into Tigray and capture certain towns, the most important being Alamada so far, which is a town in southern Tigray along this main highway that can then be used as a launch pad to advance further north into Tigray.

So what you saw initially was along the southern axis, these rebel forces advancing in multiple different directions essentially, but since then, the Ethiopian military has been able to basically push back on all of these directions and push into Tigray and start to pose a threat to TPLF and Amharic Central Territory in southern Tigray.

And just as an example, in terms of how far they push, so people have a reference point.

Beforehand, Al-Amada was really not in control of federal forces even before last week. It was outside of federal control. But now the federal government has control of Al-Amada.

So they've actually had a net gain on this front thus far. It has been a net gain on that front thus far. I have seen a report and this wasn't from the most credible or trustworthy of sources but it's a report nonetheless that at a pace the Ethiopian army is moving at it will be within the regional capital of Tigray, within a matter of days if not weeks.

What do you think of that report? What are we looking at there? I think the most important thing to note is that the ENDF advance, the Ethiopian military advance, it's not going to get any easier.

It's only going to get more challenging. In southern Tigray, the areas that the Ethiopian military has been able to capture thus far, the terrain is a bit easier than it is the further north you move into Tigray towards Mekele, the regional capital.

As the Ethiopian military begins to launch operations to move further north, they're going to be facing more unfavorable terrain and probably stronger resistance from the TPLF as the Ethiopian military moves more into TPLF as strongholds.

So I don't think I don't know how useful it is to compare the rate or to project the rate of advance that the Ethiopian military has had so far and assume that they continue that exact rate as they move into more unfavorable terrain and probably into areas with stronger TPLF resistance.

Alright, so it's a question of just how quickly they can move through the mountainous regions of the Tigray. So let's put aside what's happening in Tigray for a moment and talk about what's happening specifically in the Amhara region.

So Amhara War Updates and a Twitter account that has ties to the Fano, which is one of the many ethnically driven militia groups fighting against the Ethiopian government announced that 40 INDF soldiers had been captured a little while ago and this was one of the many victories that the Amhara War Updates and by extension the Fano are claiming.

So what is happening in Amhara? What is the situation like there for government forces and for the Amhara forces themselves?

I think it's important to distinguish between the fighting in Amhara near the Tigray regional border, that is basically the TPLF and the AFNM, which is the main Fano group, working together and then the fighting further south in Amhara which is mainly the AFNM, and what I'm talking about there is especially the fighting around Lalibela, and then also too,

We've seen reports of clashes getting closer and closer to Woldia which is that important crossroads town that I mentioned before so it seems to me that the AFNM has been willing to help the TPLF so far as it basically advances their own interests so they're clearly in their minds they clearly benefit from disrupting federal forces in any way that they can

So I think that explains why they joined the initial efforts around the Tigray regional border and southern Tigray and northeastern Amhara region but at the same time they're pursuing their own efforts as well that the TPLF is not necessarily benefiting from so the AFNM has its own goals and these operations that are further away from the Tigray regional

Border the further south you get into Amhara region and also the further west you get into Amhara region I think those operations should be viewed a bit separately than the TPLF led offensive if you will and I think that around places like Alamada and Sakota it doesn't really seem like the AFNM has been willing to sustain heavy losses on behalf of the TPLF

So we've seen the Ethiopian military make these advances and I haven't seen reports of the AFNM again which is the main final group sustaining these heavy losses and putting up basically an all-out resistance to stop this advance.

They've also been focused on their own efforts that are separate from the TPLF further south.

There are two fronts within the Amhara region and that in and of itself is a very interesting dynamic because one of the most interesting things about this most recent flare-up of conflict in Ethiopia is that we're seeing an alliance between armed groups that have traditionally never really aligned before, like the TPLF and the FANU, the Amhara group.

So why is it that along some axis the TPLF and the FANU are collaborating and obviously both groups have their own goals, their own targets to achieve their own goals that they want to achieve with this conflict.

Why aren't we seeing a combination of efforts across multiple axes in the Amhara region because wouldn't that traditionally overstretch the ENDF forces which would be a match which would provide the TPLF and the Amhara with much easier fighting opportunities.

I think that the phenomenon that you just mentioned is a real indicator of the limitations of this rebel coalition thus far.

As you mentioned when you were talking, there are significant strategic differences between the groups. They released a statement on September 20th, and again this was the TPLF, the AFN and the Afar rebel group that we were talking about earlier, the Oromo Liberation Army, and then three others as well.

They all released a statement on September 20th saying that they were united in their goal of overthrowing the Ethiopian federal government.

But then the process that they laid out beyond that was, of course, very vague, and I think that it's largely a result of the fact that they don't agree on really anything aside from their desire to overthrow the Ethiopian federal government. So there are still significant strategic differences, but also tensions between the different groups.

The precursor to the AFNM, these various FONO groups, fought against the CPLF during the First DeGray War from 2020 to 2022.

And what they were able to do is assert some level of influence over parts of DeGray that they claim or that they continue to claim are part of the Amhara region, much to the distaste of the CPLF itself.

So you have these significant underlying tensions that have caused fighting between the groups in the past and also strategic differences in terms of where they want to go. And I think that this is essentially impeding it from becoming this coherent alliance that combines that's able to organize efforts across multiple fronts in conjunction with one another.

It's kind of like high level operational and strategic coordination. I just don't think that this coalition is capable of that right now. There's a lot of internal tensions that they need to iron out before they're capable of doing something like that.

But at the same time, that doesn't mean that they won't ever be able to do it. Just because we're not seeing it right now, they could be actively working to address those tensions. At the same time though, I think it's important to note that there are some very fundamental differences between the groups.

And it's very much looking back, especially I think, as recently as a year ago or so. If we were to put ourselves back a year ago, I think we'd all be very surprised that this alliance came to fruition.

Yeah, if we were to invent the same machine and you and I were to go back and find Wilfred and Mike from a year ago, and we tell them, hey, you guys, there's an alliance that has been formed.

It's calling itself the Ethiopian People's Forces Alliance for Survival, aka SIMDO, and it's been formed by some of the rebel groups that fought against each other during the Tigray War.

I don't think Wilfred and Mike from about a year ago would believe us, because it's such an insane proposition that anyone who would have suggested it an year ago would have been laughed out of any room. Anyone who would have suggested it would have basically lost the respect of their peers.

And this is the situation we find ourselves in right now, that armed forces which have fought against each other in the past, which have shed blood, which have committed atrocities in each other's territory, now they're fighting side by side.

So I pose this question, to the FANU themselves, and I got an answer from Biruk Sileshi, I hope I'm not butchering your name, who is the head of the Foreign Affairs Department for the Amhara FANU National Movement, and is also one of the Foreign Relations Officers for the Alliance for Survival.

And according to Biruk, the leadership of the TPLF and the FANU have come to something of an understanding that they no longer need to focus too much on the past, they should be focused on the future, and that Abiy Ahmed's government is the one responsible for exploiting the divisions that exist between the various tribes within Ethiopia to extend its own

Rule.

So, Mike, I shared Biruk's answer with you about a couple of hours before we started recording this podcast. What did you think of the responses we got?

Yeah, so admittedly I wasn't able to quite read through all of them yet, but regarding the one that you were just talking about that tensions that we saw in the past have been left in the past, and that they're focused on this common enemy in the Ethiopian federal government, the land disputes in particular between the TPLF and these Fano groups, these are

Long-standing land disputes between Tigray and Amhara.

So I don't think it's as simple as saying that you're just leaving them in the past. And I think that an indicator of the limitations of this coalition, of this cooperation between the groups, is again, you really haven't seen the main final group, the AFNM, put itself out there too much on the line for the TPLF.

I think an indicator that this coalition was actually strong and that they were coordinating at a very high level would be if they were willing to sustain those losses on behalf of each other.

Generally speaking, I still think that those strategic differences remain, these underlying tensions remain, and another example of that is just simply in the goals of each group. The AFN is not opposed necessarily to a centralized federal government.

However, it's my belief and many other analysts have said the same thing that the AFN is essentially looking to restore the historic role, this historic strong role of the Amhara in a centralized federal system.

One that predates this current government and the TPLF led government from 1991 to 2018. The TPLF, on the other hand, is not in favor of a centralized federal government. That's a key dispute between them and the current federal government, which is trying to, under Abiy Ahmed, which is trying to centralize Ballard.

The TPLF is essentially looking for de facto autonomy for Tigray, seemingly, in which they are in control of Tigray without federal interference. And I also think that the TPLF has sights on regaining some of that federal or that national influence that they had when they basically dominated the government from 1991 until 2018.

So when you look at those two goals, those are pretty different goals from one another.

So when you add that on top of these land disputes and whatnot, I find it hard to believe that they've just managed to iron that all out, especially because they have not said anything or released a shared platform of any sort that would indicate that they've worked on these issues.

In the statement that the seven rebel groups released on September 20th, and again, this coalition that released the statement, the Alliance for Survival, it includes the AFNM and the TPLF, they basically kicked the can down the road on solving these issues and said, we're going to leave it up to a dialogue, but we pledge to solve these differences

Peacefully with each other.

So their main goal in the immediate term is to overthrow the government of Abiy Ahmed, but then after that, it's very unsettled what will actually happen.

They've acknowledged the disputes, but they haven't really offered a clear pathway in terms of how they're going to resolve them if they get to that point. So I just find it hard to believe that they've left it in the past.

Alright, so I asked that question of what comes next to... to the final representative that we spoke to, and he had a very interesting answer because again, as you've rightly noted, there's so much underlying tensions, there's so much underlying distrust and you know, diverging goals, diverging priorities among all the members of this group that the fact

That the group, again, exists is a miracle.

The fact that you know, they seem to want to collaborate on a common goal is insane and any attempts to actually achieve this goal would be a very significant escalation and a very significant step in this war.

So I asked him, I asked the final rep that we spoke to what will come next in terms of okay, they've removed Abiy Ahmed, but what do they do next, right? Because if you achieve your goal, you like the dog that caught the car, the cat that caught its own tail, what do you do with it, right?

So this is what they said. Looking beyond the inevitable removal of the current administration, the alliance has articulated a clear principled roadmap for the establishment of an all-inclusive transitional administration and transitional government.

This transitional framework will encompass all legitimate political stakeholders, including those engaged in peaceful political struggle and armed resistance alongside robust civil society institutions.

This provisional authority will be specialized will be operationalized through independent specialized commissions and road transparent public consultation.

This pantry excuse me, the primary mandate of this transitional period will be to rebuild independent democratic institutions, fortify a genuine multi-party electoral system, guarantee freedom of the press and ensure a seamless permanent transition to a fully civilian-led constitutional democracy.

This remains our unalterable commitment to the people of Ethiopia and our international partners.

So, Mike, what do you make of this statement? It's clear that they have these very broad aspirational goals. At the same time, there's a big difference between having these goals and then being able to implement them or implement what you need to be able to accomplish these goals.

I just think, again, it all goes back to these fundamental differences between the groups. If these underlying tensions and strategic differences are not ironed out beforehand, they're just basically planning to solve them in the event if they were actually able to theoretically overthrow the federal government.

Then they're just going to essentially figure it out.

The representative had talked about establishing certain institutions or councils under this transitional government to figure this out. I think that it's pretty difficult to do this as you go, especially when the groups or the coalition is not cohesive itself.

Again, I think looking at their platform is certainly helpful, but we don't have that context of the discussions that they've had with each other, if there have been any agreements on how they're actually going to carry out the work of transitioning from being a rebel coalition to then a high-level political strategic alliance and that's a very big jump that

You have to make and of course, this would be in the event of them actually accomplishing their battlefield goals, which as we've discussed before so far, their successes have been quite limited on one front and they've actually lost ground on the other front So again, a very difficult position that the alliance places itself in I want to talk about one of

The groups that is part of the alliance the Romo Liberation Army So the OLA on the Amhara have years of bad blood between them because, again, of all these atrocities that both sides committed against each other and of course the final representative claimed that the OLA and the final have reached some sort of understanding about an international mediated

Investigation into all of the atrocities but, again, a lot of lofty speech without much concrete action.

The action that we have seen is that the OLA hasn't really participated in any of the attacks that have been carried out by the alliance forces. So, in the south of the country where the OLA operates, what is the situation like, Mike? The OLA insurgency in my assessment is not as potent as the AFNM's insurgency.

I believe that the AFNM is more active around key population centers and key roads. It's not to say that the OLA isn't active around any population centers and roads, but I just think that their reach and their capabilities are a little bit more limited than the AFNM. Basically, the OLA's strongholds are in the rural areas of Orumbia region.

Now, in terms of their involvement in the current offensive, we've seen them essentially stay on the sidelines thus far, even though they have been involved in these joint statements, particularly the ones of September 20th announcing the formation of this coalition.

But from the reports that I've seen and the eyes of many analysts, the OLA is essentially a weak link in the coalition in terms of its ability to agree with the other members, especially and mostly the AFNM.

There are significant tensions between the AFNM and the OLA, similar to the tensions between the AFNM and the TPLF in that the AFNM and the OLA have land disputes around the Oromia-Amhara border and also their strategic objectives differ as well and actually conflict with one another.

Overall, I think that the OLA's lack of involvement thus far is an indicator that they're taking a wait-and-see approach for the current moment, that they're not willing to put themselves out there and potentially sustain losses and sacrifice some of their own objectives for the objectives of the coalition. At least not right now.

But again, the battlefield situation is fluid.

Things could change, and we don't know what's happening behind the scenes. But the OLA has seemingly been the most hesitant member of this coalition. I want to share a theory I've been toying around with for the past couple of days about why the OLA is so hesitant.

There was a statement put out by the Orobor Liberation Front, which is the former political wing of the OLA. And it is basically castigating the OLA for joining this group.

So I'm reading a statement that was shared by the Orobor Liberation Front, putting here the Northern Coalition, known as SIMDO, aims to turn Oromia into a battleground for an unnecessary war and reverse the fruits of our struggle so far gained and control Oromia to usurp its resources once again.

The Oromo people cannot remain silent on this. The OLF calls on the Oromo people to unite, regardless of political differences, and to defend their territory and villages without infighting on the, or without infringing, rather, on the rights of others.

And, of course, another section we also like to remind those who stood with our historical addressers and exploiters while claiming to struggle for or rob more people that they are making a historical mistake, but history will never forgive them.

We call on them to reconsider their push. So, my fear has been this obvious obvious resistance to the deal within, you know, the highest level of liberal liberation struggle factors has created that hesitancy. What do you think, Mike?

I think that the OLA in particular is likely concerned about the cost of joining this conflict actively. If there's all of a sudden a federal government response in the Aromia region, the OLA really does risk significant backlash from its own constituents, not its constituents, but the Oromo people in the areas where it is present.

I think that's a big calculation for them in terms of waiting and seeing for now and not definitively getting involved thus far.

I want to talk about one of the other groups that's part of this alliance, the GOMOs movement. They said in a statement that it has no undoing and they denied being a member of the alliance despite claims by the alliance leadership to the contrary. What did you make of that?

I'll get to that in one second. Actually, one thing that I want to mention too on the OLA is in basically the OLA, yes, they signed on to that September 20th statement by the Alliance for Survival saying that they were a member of it.

But the OLA has also recently released a statement essentially hedging their, like any involvement they have with these other groups, basically saying that these disputes that, again, acknowledging the disputes that they've had, and specifically mentioned Wolega, which is a disputed territory, and basically saying that these disputes have not been solved and

That they will need to get solved at some point.

So, essentially kind of hedging their involvement a bit, just as an example to the previous point. But, yes, about the groups in Benishangu Gavuz, so those were the smaller groups members of this coalition anyway. So, you know, the main members of the coalition are the TPLF, the AFNM, and the OLA.

The other four groups that were announced as being part of it are relatively small groups.

We've seen the Afar group become active, but the Ogadan National Liberation Front also released a statement that's somewhat similar to the Gavuz group in that they said that, you know, they're in a political struggle against the federal government, but not a military one.

And with the Gavuz groups as well, I just don't know how much they had to offer this rebel coalition militarily.

And again, I think it just goes as an example of they're only willing to play along with this coalition insofar as it advances their own interests, but they're not willing to sacrifice their own interests on behalf of the coalition as a whole. So again, I think it's just another indicator of some of the structural weaknesses within the coalition.

So with all of these structural weaknesses, how long can the coalition survive?

Because if members who were supposed to, even if they are minor junior partners in the coalition, they are already distancing themselves from the group, they are hedging their bets, and they are clearly putting their own self-interests first. How long can a group survive with that much internal tension?

And that's not even taking into account all of the internal tensions that come with the various groups having decades of bad blood between them.

I think that the coalition can sustain itself at a kind of a lower with lower level operational coordination and tactical coordination for a long time, even with these disputes, just because, again, they do align on wanting yes, overthrow, but in the immediate term, disrupt and uproot the federal government from certain areas.

So, I think that's a good point. So, I think that they can maintain that lower level of coordination.

But, in terms of whether the coalition can survive in the long term or not, again, as I listed before, there are significant structural weaknesses and tensions and differences between the members. And, I think that if the battlefield situation is going well for them, they will have to address those strategic differences.

If they're unable to, then that's going to be a serious problem that could lead to the disintegration of the coalition.

If the battlefield situation is not going well, that could also lead to a disintegration of the coalition because the groups are going to increasingly turn inward and try to secure their own and advance their own interests. And, they're not going, likely not going to be willing to take these losses on behalf, of each other.

So, in that case, you would basically see a de facto, if not an outright, disintegration of the coalition.

But, that being said, just because the coalition is, you know, maybe not active at this, you know, high operational and strategic level, and, you know, even if it does run to issues and end up falling apart, that doesn't mean that it's the end of this conflict.

The OLA, the AFNM, and the TPLF have all shown a capability to independently continue waging, you know, a conflict.

In the case of the TPLF, it's been more political since the end of the Tigray War, but they've all shown an ability to, you know, continue being clashing both militarily and politically with the federal government, not independently of each other.

And, you know, their individual differences with the federal government are not going to go anywhere and their capabilities are not going to go anywhere even if the coalition disintegrates. So just because it disintegrates, if that doesn't end up happening, it doesn't mean it's a win for the federal government.

The AFNM, you know, the main FONO group again, that insurgency has only gotten worse since it began in 2023.

You know, FONO groups have consolidated themselves and, you know, formed the AFNM back in 2025 or actually early 2026. And since then, the insurgency has only strengthened. The TPLF has, you know, been in pretty steadfast opposition to the federal government, since the end of the Great War.

That hasn't changed. And then the OLA has waged a decades-long insurgency against the Ethiopian federal government. So, the coalition surviving does not necessarily mean a resolution to the confluence.

Or I should say, the coalition not surviving does not mean a resolution to the confluence.

Yeah, and that makes sense, because, as you've rightly said, this, these groups have been fighting against the Ethiopian national government long before the coalition was formed, and unless, you know, the underlying issues that caused them to launch the insurgencies in the first place are addressed, they'll obviously be fighting the government for a long

While after, you know, even if the alliance disintegrates.

So let's move away from the alliance, and even if you move away from Ethiopia itself for a moment, let's talk about what's happening in neighboring Syria and neighboring Sudan, and of course, Egypt as well.

The Ethiopian government has accused all three governments, all three neighboring nations of funding and supporting the alliance, which is something our connect at the funnel has denied as well. So, what do you make of the situation between the government in Addis Ababa and its regional partners?

And is there a risk of a widening escalation that draws in multiple conflicts all at once?

Yes, that risk is definitely there. What we've seen since this crisis war broke out last week is reports of Eritrea mobilizing forces and even exerting a presence in a far region, which would be an escalation. The Ethiopian government would definitely see that as a significant escalation.

And the Eritreans have been supportive of some of the different groups within the Alliance for Survival and along with Sudan seemingly played a role in facilitating the formation of this coalition. Their current involvement in the hostilities is still unclear, both on the Eritrean side, despite the reports, as well as the Sudanese side as well.

The Sudanese side denied it, so did the Eritreans have denied involvement with the rebel coalition as well.

Again, it's a little bit unclear thus far. Yes, no, it could definitely cause a larger escalation. You've seen these outstanding tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan.

Ethiopia has accused Sudan of supporting the TPLF and its efforts against the federal government. The Sudanese armed forces or the Sudanese military which controls the Sudanese government, they have had long-standing ties to the TPLF, and the Ethiopian government has cited that as a source of significant tension between Ethiopia and Sudan.

And I think that likely played a part in Ethiopia's decision to back the rapid support forces in the Sudanese Civil War against the Sudanese military.

Moving on to Eritrea, whether the Ethiopian federal government is claiming Eritrean involvement in Afar, or whether the Eritrean forces are actually involved in Afar, that is also a significant flashpoint because the Afar region is in close proximity to the Eritrea's port of Asad, which Ethiopia has openly stated its desire to gain sea access through.

That is also a significant flashpoint as well. Regarding Egypt's involvement, Ethiopia and Egypt are in this broader regional competition with one another over who is the preeminent power in the region.

It extends to certain flashpoints. Of course, there's the Red Sea access. Egypt does not think that Ethiopia should have a role in the governance of the Red Sea, whereas Ethiopia clearly thinks that it should.

Also, the one that many people know about is the issue over Ethiopia's construction of dams on the Nile River as well, which Egypt sees as an existential threat to its water supply.

So the tensions are definitely there, and you've seen Egypt draw closer to both Eritrea and the Sudanese military as well, and they're a key backer of the Sudanese military in the civil war there. Whether Egypt is involved with this rebel coalition, I've seen nothing definitive on that.

But, if it chose to get involved, its eyes with the Sudanese military and the Eritreans provide a pathway for it to either passively or indirectly support the rebel coalition. Alright.

It's a very volatile situation right now in the whole of Africa that's the gist of it with so many competing interests and so many different groups supporting different groups and forgive me for using the word groups multiple times within the boundaries of different nations and with that we're going to leave it there because we're a little over the time

Allotted to record this so Mike what will you be watching over the next coming weeks as this conflict progresses what I'll be watching for mainly is the involvement of other members of the rebel coalition especially the OLA in the hostilities or an expansion of the involvement of the AFNM and their coordination with the TPLF I think that would be an

Indication that this coalition of course is strengthening and that it would pose a larger problem to the Ethiopian federal government another thing that I'm looking for is massive redeployments by the Ethiopian military to northern Ethiopia where the fighting is taking place because I think that would signal eventually federal government plans to essentially

Neutralize the TPLS completely where so far I'm not saying that isn't their intention it's just a bit unclear right now and all things considered I think the response has been somewhat limited thus far and yeah so I think those are definitely the two main things and then of course the last component of it is involvement by external actors such as Eritrea

Sudan potentially Egypt but mostly talking about Eritrea and then to a lesser extent Sudan the deployment of Eritrean troops within Ethiopia especially in places other than Tigray would be a significant flashpoint for between Ethiopia and Eritrea Alright and on my end I'll be watching to see just what the Ethiopian national government does in the areas that

It now controls, in the areas especially in the Tigray region that it has gained the upper hand in and just how the battlefield developments progress that's what I'll be watching and to you our dear listeners, thank you so much for giving us your time, for being here with us, for listening to us ramble on and on about the situation in Ethiopia we wouldn't be

Able to do what we do without you guys we are absolutely grateful so thank you so much once again and of course thank you to Mike, my only guest who's been on the podcast three times, I am absolutely grateful to be able to call you a friend, a colleague as we cover in all the insanity that's happening in the world.

Mike, do you have a last word for the people?

Thank you for having me and for those interested in continuing to follow the conflicts feel free to go to the website of the Critical Threats Project, it's criticalthreats.org, we'll be rolling out an Ethiopia War Security Review, which is basically just a readout of the battlefield situation as well as doing broader analysis and making bigger assessments on

The different developments in the war.

So yeah, feel free to go to our website and check that out.

All right. And with that, we're going to leave you guys again. Thank you so much for being here with us.

Thank you so much for listening. We will catch you on the next edition of the Deuce Health Podcast. Hopefully one day Mike and I will be able to just sit down and talk about normal life stuff instead of you talking about all the conflicts that are erupting in the region.

But again, thank you so much. We'll catch you in the next one.