Dr. Yagiz Sullu Talks African Economics.

Ladies and gentlemen, good morning, good evening, good afternoon, whenever and wherever you're listening to us from, this is the Due South podcast with me, your host, Wilfred Waimiri, and today I am joined by a brand new guest, someone we have not had on our podcast before, and someone I am very, very excited to speak with.

Yağız Süllü, he is a PhD who recently completed his studies at Virginia Tech, and he is the front-end principal analyst at Süllü Strategic Advisory LLC. So I'm going to throw it to him to let him introduce himself and tell you guys a little bit about himself.

Let's just take it from there. Yağız, say hi to the people. Thank you for having me, Wilfred.

My name is Yağız Süllü, and as you mentioned, I just finished my PhD studies at Virginia Tech, where my research focused on energy policy, and how oil-dependent economies respond to declining oil production, including comparative research on Gabon and Equatorial Guinea.

And today, my broader work focuses on assessing geopolitical risk, energy security, and how global developments affect economies and businesses. I'm looking forward to discussing our topic today, and thank you for your invitation.

All right, Yağız. So, since this is your first time on our podcast, and this is the first time our audience is getting to meet you, tell us a little bit about how you got into the field, and why you have a passion for Africa, and why you do the things you do. Of course.

So, in the United States, Africa remains as a very understudied region, and with the Trump administration's new policy over Africa, which is trade, not aid, we are likely to see new developments emerging between the U.S.-African relations.

And with China's interest in Africa, the U.S. is now competing with a major superpower in the region, and therefore, Africa will be very relevant in the coming months.

And as we see from the Iranian war, and the instability in the Middle East, we see that Africa becomes a major alternative for the United States' interests, especially about its oil and also the critical minerals.

So because of these new developments, I wanted to study the understudied region, and I learned a lot about Equatorial Guinea and Gabon during my PhD work. So it was very interesting to learn more about the region. All right.

So it seems like you have a lot of deep love for the region. So tell us a little bit more about the work you do with Sulu Strategic Advisories LLC, and then we'll get into the final topic of the day. Of course.

But the first one. Of course. So basically at Sulu Strategic Advisory, I work with multinational companies on giving them research and intelligence services about how they should approach entering the markets.

I especially work with Middle East entities right now who are trying to expand their operations overseas, and I provide them with political risk assessment reports and also strategic advising on how they should have precautions before entering foreign markets. as part of their operations.

So basically, the firm also publishes weekly reports and articles about the geopolitical developments around the world and informing its audience how those risks and developments are relevant for US interests. So it's basically a company focusing on geopolitical risk and energy security specifically.

All right. So let's take it from there. That idea of geopolitical risk and the stability of nations.

So this is something you covered in your PhD, right? Yes. I've been thinking about it and I've been trying to think of the best question I could ask you for this.

So I had to get a little help from chat GPT just to get a little bit more familiar with your dissertation. So this is a question I've had some help coming up with. So when people think about the political dangers facing an oil producing country, they normally think about an oil price crash, right?

And, you know, that's the opposite of what you're experiencing right now. The price of oil has gone through the roof and, you know, it's good for all those oil producing nations, right? Your work focuses instead on terminal decline.

What is the difference and why is terminal decline potentially much harder for governments to manage? So, when we see a price shock, it is almost temporary. The oil prices are volatile.

So, that's why when a country experiences a boom or a bust, this is only a temporary period where it can provide a short revenue margin, but in the longer term, the revenues can come back and basically support oil dependent countries' economies.

But when we look at decline in production, and especially it's being terminal, which means that there is a really unlikely prospect that the oil production will be reversed back into peak levels. So, the terminal decline is a term that I came up with during my Ph.D. work.

And basically, terminal decline is a very structural problem because every barrel that is lost because of the oil reserve depletion, a country would experience economic pressure and therefore will be unable to meet its public spending budgets. And also distributing oil revenues throughout the society.

So it is more of a structural problem compared to the traditional oil booms and busts.

And it's becoming highly relevant for countries dependent on oil because as we see, countries in Africa specifically are suffering from this terminal decline. Some examples include Angola. Equatorial Guinea and Gabon and also Cameroon as well.

So when terminal decline happens, what will entail is that countries that are traditionally exporting oil from these countries would have to find other resources and may shift their operations in other regions. And we see this from the African economy.

There are economies that in Equatorial Guinea and Gabon specifically, oil companies which operated in these countries for many decades decided to pull out from these countries.

So it was a major blow to these African economies because when an oil company exits their country and halts operations, that will mean that the country is no longer attractive. Failed for prospective oil companies who might be interested in their resources.

So that's why terminal decline is really relevant today because as we see, the clean energy transition is still slow and some countries are also determined to use fossil fuels in the future.

So that's why oil is still very, very relevant. And with the Iran war, we see that the spike in oil prices are affecting every member of the society. All right.

So that idea of terminal decline is very, very interesting for me. So this is something I will be thinking about long after we record this podcast. So I have just one follow-up question.

Oh, actually two, but let's start with the first one. At what point does, you know, declining production stop becoming primarily an energy problem and, you know, an economics problem and transition to becoming a political problem?

So after peak production, which is the highest rate of production that a country experiences, the production enters into a steep decline and we see the symptoms of terminal decline in this situation.

So think about, about the bell curve. So there's the peak moment and then from the peak, there's a steep decline period. And some countries are already prepared for this terminal decline issue because when they do field assessments, they can actually assess the viability of reserves and which reserves are going to be depleted anytime soon.

So some countries are prepared for this and they have sovereign wealth funds to buffer, to buffer revenues losing from terminal decline.

So these sovereign wealth funds are actually very relevant, but in other countries, they are not fully prepared for this moment because an oil boom gives high prospects and it's basically a celebration in a country because oil is also a national identity of some countries. They really cherish their fossil fuels and their resources.

So when terminal decline hits, some countries experience political instability because now the state has less revenues in their coffers and therefore they're not able to increase public spending and provide the services needed by their respective societies. And when that happens, we see protests happening and also regime changes.

And one case that is highly relevant to this scenario is Gabon.

So after almost 50 years in power, the Bongo regime was ousted by a military coup in 2023 by the military forces in the country. And we see the political instability taking place. When oil production entered terminal decline in the country, the state was unable to meet its public spending goals.

And there were like extremely high protests during the 2016 elections. And also there was a previously attempted coup in 2019 as well. And finally people, people had enough and also the military forces turned against the regime itself and they ousted president Bongo from power.

So this was very interesting to see because when a regime is in power after for 50 years, almost seeing that regime collapsing is very important because it's really forces its allies to reconsider and re-evaluate their relationships with those countries. All right. So the risk of a political crisis does exist.

I want to briefly discuss the risk of, you know, an economic crisis.

So when I was covering the crisis in the DRC, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I honed in on a very interesting phenomenon, the idea of the resource caste, so this is the counterintuitive phenomenon where countries that are rich in natural resources often experience less economic growth and worse development outcomes than resources for countries, and,

You know, there are two reasons for this, right?

First, an abundance of minerals seems to make countries susceptible to the Dutch disease, a phenomenon where one sector of a country's economy experiences rapid expansion, outpacing everything else, and then the government, it becomes over-dependent on the revenue that this industry produces and incentivizes further expansion to the detriment of other

Sectors.

So the wealth that this creates yields workers away from other industries, diminishing them even further. And then second, mineral wealth seems to attract conflict, like fruit flies over a banana that's been left out overnight.

So, Yagiz, how do you, I've seen this phenomenon of the resource curse in the countries you've covered, and how does terminal decline play into that?

I did observe the resource curse when I was studying the countries that I was focusing on. As you mentioned, one of the symptoms of the resource curse is the Dutch disease. So, when mineral sector dominates the economy, the regimes are investing less in other industries, such as agriculture and manufacturing.

And when that happens, they become overly dependent on minerals and hydrocarbons. So, when a price shock hits or when production interest terminal decline, then basically the country wouldn't have any alternative sources of revenues unless they invest in a sovereign wealth fund.

And the concept of the sovereign wealth fund applies not just Africa, but in other countries around the world as well.

For example, Norway has the highest portfolio in its sovereign wealth fund and it has trillions basically embedded in the fund itself. But when some countries are not diversified enough, that means that they're suffering from the resource curse itself.

And also, besides the economic diversification angle, what is really important is also how resource curse limits development in resource-dependent countries.

For example, during my research about the African economies and based on my interviews with government officials, government officials, and analysts covering the region, what I learned is that the regimes have some sort of patronal networks consisting of elites from the politics and the economics field, and the incumbent president has really good

Relationships with these people.

And through the resource revenues that they have, are able to provide contracts to these people or other economic opportunities. So we see that in resource-dependent countries experiencing the resource curse, only a few networks are actually seeing the benefits of the oil revenues, but the larger society itself is not.

They're not getting the full benefits that they're entitled to, which raises corruption and transparency issues. And when you look at Freedom House's reports on Africa and the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, the African countries are not listed as transparent countries.

They're almost at the bottom of the Corruption Perception Index, for example, in Transparency International's reports.

And this is a serious issue because that deters investors entering these markets. Thank you for that very convincing answer. So, sticking with the idea of the resource cast, the only way to truly avoid it and for our country to truly protect its economy, is by diversification, right?

One of the countries we've spent a lot of time thinking about, Gabon, has the opportunity to diversify. It has oil, manganese, timber, and potentially major iron ore production. Oil becomes less important, but mining becomes more important.

They won't really have diversified, right? Do you see a pathway where, Gabon can transition from oil, perhaps to these other minerals, and then to full diversification, or will it just move from oil and minerals and then just stick there?

Under the leadership of the Mongol regime, Gabon experienced very high economic growth when oil was relevant in its economy.

But after the coup, and the new administration took place in the country, it really became an attractive destination, not for its oil, but for its critical minerals. And in 2025, Gabon was one of just five African countries whose leaders were invited to the White House for talks focused on trade, investment, and other business opportunities.

And Gabon's new president, President Nugoyama, cleared that Gabon is seeking win-win partnerships with the U.S. entities and said that it seeks American investments to help process more of the country's mineral sources.

So a major power such as the U.S. still relies on critical minerals for its battery production and steel production as well. And Gabon is a very attractive destination for them because it is the second largest manganese producer accounting for 25% of global production. So now we see a competition between China and the U.S. in Gabon.

For example, before the White House meeting in 2025, in 2023, China and Gabon launched their co-cancer strategic partnership where both countries committed to strengthen their relationships and also increase their trade of critical minerals.

So now for Gabon itself, what will be really important is whether Gabon will work closely with China or it will shift this approach to the U.S. Gabon's current president was actually very favorable to form a new relationship with the United States during that White House meeting.

But also China has invested billions of dollars for Gabon's infrastructure projects.

So now Gabon has to make a strategic decision on which partner it should rely on when it's experiencing thermal decline oil production. Because now... With less oil revenues accumulating in the country's reserves, it has to make a strategic change towards critical minerals to actually open a new revenue stream.

All right. So, Yagiz, let's move away from, you know, the idea of terminal decline for a minute to talk about what is happening in other areas of the world, right? So, right now, terminal decline might not really be a worry for, you know, African oil-producing nations because oil prices are extremely high because of the war in Iran.

At the time that we are speaking, today is the 16th of September, 2026, just to give our audience a temporal signpost so that you know when we recorded this and when this conversation was happening that Brent Crude is past $100, which means that, and this is a global benchmark, which means that oil-producing countries are getting a lot of money for their

Oil, even though in some cases there might not be enough oil to sell, right?

So how is this current crisis being felt in Africa? Let's start there.

So I think the crisis is highly relevant to not just Africa, but around the world as well. As the global oil prices are increasing, consumers are feeling the pressure at the pump, and this applies to the residents in African countries as well.

So basically, when we look at this crisis, it is likely that we will see this war going on, not just for weeks, but months.

So my forecast would be we will see increasing fuel prices even more. And even in the United States right now, consumers are really feeling the pressure at the pump, and people are actually trying to limit their driving times or... engaging in carpooling or taking public transportation as a means to travel.

So in Africa, the scale of this issue will be much bigger because although rising oil prices can benefit an administration because high oil prices would mean larger revenues for the state coffers, but also the prices of the fuel will be increasing as well domestically.

So I think Africa is at a crossroads at this time trying to decide whether to pursue oil as a resource to sell or diversify its portfolio and engage in other industries so that it could provide the services for its people. So the Strait of Hormuz definitely had a big impact on the global oil price rise.

But it also gave countries an option to actually not depend on oil and pursue clean energy for fuel and also for heating.

So higher prices can provide fiscal breathing room for regimes, but they cannot reverse geological decline as we discussed previously. So that is really relevant for the fact that oil-dependent governments have to prepare not only for fluctuations in oil prices, but also for any future disruptions as well.

This was just the beginning of the Iran war, and now we see the clash between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia.

So that's another crisis that is evolving rapidly and will definitely have an impact on the oil prices. So what I would say would be that African countries should use this time very efficiently and start thinking about the future without oil and try to adopt clean energy technologies and accumulate investment.

So that its citizens will also not be hurt by the rising oil prices in the future.

So whenever I think about the crisis that hit Africa in the immediate aftermath of the Iran war, the first country that comes to mind is usually Ethiopia because there were reports from Addis Ababa of petrol stations running out of fuel and drivers spending days on end with their cars basically immobile because they couldn't really get the amount of fuel

That they needed, which is a very, very big catastrophe considering how rapidly developing the Ethiopian economy was.

So in response to this, the Ethiopian government activated the national logistics carrier, Ethiopian Shipping Lines, to try and mitigate the worst of this disaster. Ethiopian Shipping Lines brought fuel all the way from Nigeria to Ethiopia, about 120,000 litres.

If memory serves me correct, it might not even be the exact figure or the right units. It could have been 120,000 tonnes. Yeah, I think that's more accurate, 120,000 tonnes of fuel.

And it helped mitigate the worst of the disaster for Ethiopia. Ethiopia had the benefit of having a national carrier line that it could activate when push came to shove. What other countries, in your view, in your professional opinion, had as good or generally a good way of approaching this crisis?

You know, what countries were fundamentally better prepared? The Ethiopia crisis really shows that how some African countries are actually getting affected by the Iran war because Ethiopia imports all of its petroleum fuels and the Middle East war disrupted one of its major supply arrangements.

So this Ethiopia case is a really good lesson on why African countries should focus on not using fossil fuels in the future and adopting clean energy technologies and I think after Ethiopia what comes to my mind is basically Ghana and also Burkina Faso and Mali as well.

These are actually excellent cases for our conversation because Ghana's state-owned post has reduced diesel and gasoline exports to Burkina Faso and Mali to prioritize Ghanaian demand. Amid the Iranian war and Burkina Faso reportedly requested oil and Mali also requested that.

But it demonstrates how a global energy shock can move through African regional supply chains.

And another case that we should focus on would be Nigeria as well. So Nigeria is endowed with high oil reserves and higher crude prices can increase export earnings for the country. But Nigeria's growing domestic refining and capacity gives it more of an insulation and potentially an opportunity than many other African economies.

Because Nigeria still has lots of oil reserves and a rich in hydrocarbons. So I think Nigeria was prepared for this crisis. And then one of the least ready countries was, I think, Equatorial Guinea as well, because we don't see much efforts undertaken by the regime to transition away from fossil fuels.

Although production is at hand with historical lows at Equatorial Guinea, we see that the country is not using its clean energy potential during this crisis and still relies on fossil fuels for its economy. So I think it's a country that was affected by the resource curse phenomenon.

And in this crisis, I don't think that the country is actually pursuing the way and the available options that it has to pursue.

And basically in Kenya too, which imports almost all of its petroleum, rising fuel prices fed directly into domestic economic pressures in the country. And the situation remains very relevant today because renewed disruption to sell the alternative export infrastructure is adding uncertainty to Kenya's supply outlook.

So in general, the level that the African countries are affected by the crisis varies.

Some countries who have vast oil resources, such as Nigeria or let's say Angola, they will be better prepared to offset the shortage problem, but other countries, such as Kenya and also Burkina Faso, Mali, are at risk right now because they're importing their oils from other countries.

And this could turn into a broader crisis once fuel prices go up and there will be more shortages in the future. - As someone who lives and walks in Kenya, I can tell you guys for a fact that everything that Yagiz has said is true. Our government was definitely not prepared for the energy shock.

And there has been a lot and a lot of economic pressure on every other sector of the economy because of just how ubiquitous oil is nearly everywhere. We don't think about it, but the price of oil affects everything. So if petrol becomes more expensive, fertilizer also becomes more expensive, food becomes more expensive.

And with governments like Kenya, governments that don't really have that economic buffer that comes from enjoying higher oil prices, there's very little money available to the government in order for it to subsidize, that's the word, in order for it to subsidize the lives of its people. Because living at some point becomes extremely expensive.

So Yagiz, with that in mind, right?

How are governments navigating the political consequences of this economic shock? - As we discussed previously, the oil shortages and also the rise in prices are especially important periods in our country's political trajectory, because these are the moments that people can go to the streets and protest, and the incumbents may lose their legitimacy in front

Of its people, because once the country is actually getting all of its oil from overseas or other countries, the people are not feeling the pressure at the pump, but at these moments, it's really important to consider what will happen in Kenya.

So what I envision will be that Kenya will experience the shortages and also the crisis of the rising fuel prices more than just a few weeks because we see that the sides are not looking to halt the hostilities anytime soon. So I think, I would expect that people in Kenya would start complaining even more about the oil, about the fuel crisis itself.

This will actually may influence the incumbent administration's strategy towards securing oil from alternative countries. And I think diversification of suppliers will be really relevant in this case. I think the biggest, bigger risk in Kenya will be how to keep paying more for resources to secure oil.

That means that we will see higher transportation and food costs in the country, greater inflation, a larger import bill and more pressure on government finances. And the government then will face with a difficult choice, whether it will allow consumers to absorb higher fuel prices or spend scarce public resources on cushioning them.

So it will be dependent on the government's risk assessment on what would happen in the country.

But the longer the disruption lasts, the more an external energy shock becomes a broader Kenyan economic shock, I think.

So as someone who has lived through economic shocks within Kenya, I can guarantee you for a fact that, you know, the political backlash is going to be real, you know, past a certain point of economic pain, because the Kenyan people can only take so much pain before they just rebel, right?

So that's one of the main takeaways that I have whenever I, you know, think about the political costs of such economic catastrophes.

So when we look at history, we basically had oil shocks in the past. And one of the memorable historical events is the Iranian revolution in 1979. And during this period, the oil prices were actually high, but people still protested over the regime's authoritarian nature, and thus the shock was overthrown from power.

So I think when a shock takes place, people reevaluate their government's ability to be in power, and when they see that the incumbent administration is weakening, they use the opportunity to actually articulate their demands from the government itself.

So in the case of an oil shock, that everybody is experiencing around the world, this is a historical moment that is indicating how a major war can disrupt oil prices and lead to fuel shortages in other countries.

So I think in this moment, we will see, and this applies to Kenya and also other countries as well in the region, people will start to reevaluate their government's performance and make strategic decisions on whether to continue to support the government by absorbing the high prices and also experiencing the shortages or they would start to rebel and

Articulate their demands more straight and think about maybe a future with a new incumbent administration and pursue their interests.

So I think if this war continues for, let's say, six months to up to a year, we will definitely see more political instability appearing in the African region and thus we will see how public opinion changes about incumbent administrations.

All right, let's move away from the relationship that people have with their government to the relationship that the governments themselves have with each other, specifically how African governments interact with the Gulf.

So over the years, whenever we talk about Africa, we usually think about it in terms of its relationship with the US, its relationship with Europe, or even its relationship with China.

We don't really think about Africa's relationship with the Gulf unless, you know, you're in the field like you and I. So in that case, right, with Africa's relationship in the Gulf top of mind, how do you see the conflict that's happening in Iran and the instability that has been occasioned by it?

How do you see it affecting Africa's relationship with Gulf countries?

I think with the... Iran war continuing and not ending anytime soon, the African and the Gulf relations will be deeper in this case. So I think we will see four effects.

First, energy dependence is making Gulf relations more important. Countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia depend heavily on imported petroleum, and much of it is connected to Gulf suppliers and shipping routes. So I think the disruption will remind African governments that their economic security is very closely tied to the stability in the Gulf.

And also, the second angle would be investments may become more uncertain because Gulf countries are an important source of capital for African infrastructure, agriculture, logistics, and energy.

If Gulf governments have to redirect capital and attention toward domestic reconstruction, security, and economic stabilization, some African investment projects could be delayed or reduced.

I think when we look at these investment risks, some of the countries that will be affected by it will be Kenya, Egypt, Senegal, and South Africa, which have significant, exposure to Gulf investments.

So with the war going on, I think Gulf countries are more attentive right now to where to invest and how to spend their revenues. So I think we will see very important investments, fluctuations towards Africa.

And then the Horn of Africa will also become more strategically important because the Gulf and the Horn are separated only by the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar already have substantial political, commercial, and security interests there. So ports and maritime routes in places such as Djibouti, Somalia, Somaliland, Sudan, and the broader Red Sea corridor will be more strategically valuable when Gulf shipping routes are threatened by the war that is going on.

I think the UAE and African Union will view this connection when having meetings and basically discussing the Iranian war issue.

So I think the Horn of Africa will become more important than ever. And finally, the African governments may try to rather than abandon the Gulf, because Gulf still has large oil reserves and is a region that is very economically important for African countries.

But I think it will be wrong to say that the African governments will drift away from the Gulf, because Gulf capital and trade are too important for them.

But in the end, the African governments will in a sense, they will definitely have to seek for other resources as well. So I think what we will see in the African government's approach will be to continue to strengthen relationships with the Gulf, but also seek for other resources from different countries. Okay, let's move on.

Away from the broader Gulf and just focus in on one country in the region, Iran, right? Iran is currently fighting the US and Israel in the war that started on the 28th of February.

But Iran has also spent years building relationships across Africa, trying to build friends, make alliances, and you just do the kind of geopolitics that we will expect from a country that had been previously diplomatically isolated, right?

So will Africa become more strategically important to Iran, in your view, after the end of this war? I think it will be relevant for Iran's interests because with the confrontation with the US and Israel, we see that Iran will have limitations on investing in its relationships with African countries.

But I think the most important part of this relationship is basically Iran developing notable security relationships with countries such as Sudan, Ethiopia, and this includes military cooperation and drone relationships as well.

Before the current war, Tehran was actively trying to expand its engagement and actually the current president described Africa as strategically important for Iran's interests constantly in its public speeches. So I think for Iran's interests, what will matter will be the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Like Djibouti holds significant U.S. military infrastructure and the Horn sits directly across from Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula and Sudan also provides access to the Red Sea.

So I think with these aspects, Iran would try to strengthen its relationships with African countries instead of attacking U.S. military sites in these countries, not to risk its relationship with Africa. But I think there is an important distinction here.

So Africa may become more strategically valuable to Iran, while Iran will become less capable of projecting influence there due to the war.

So I think the interest is still there on Iran. On the Iranian side, especially about the security relationships it's establishing with African countries and the drone technology that Iran and the African region are cooperating on will still be relevant.

But I think right now Iran is experiencing a currency devaluation, political instability, and of course the war with the U.S. and Israel.

So I think right now the focus is on ending the hostilities and also revitalize the country's economy because right now as we see in the news the Iranian people are suffering a lot. So I think right now the Iran will focus on that side, domestic politics, ensuring stability, and also ending the war.

But I think after the war we will see Iran's continuing influence in Africa because China, for example, which is an ally of Iran, is already having a big influence in African region.

So I think with its connection to China, Iran would try to utilize that relationship and create a sphere of influence in the region. So let's move on to the question of how America now interacts with the global South, and in particular, Africa.

So again, for our audience, I'm recording this on the 16th of September, but sometime within the next few days, I will have a video coming out discussing how Washington has gone from reciprocal democracy and transactional diplomacy.

What has changed and what kind of impact is it having in Africa? I think what has changed was the understanding that not all the aid that the United States provides to Africa are used efficiently. There was a lot of backlash on aid-making organizations in the United States, and as you know, how the USAID operates.

Operations were shut down last year, so there was an understanding in the United States that the aid is not achieving the goals it intended to achieve. So I think the understanding is right now if aid is not working for Africa, then we should re-evaluate our relationship and focus more on the business side.

Having a relationship based on trades and investments and for critical minerals especially, this is really important because the United States is very dependent on critical minerals from Africa and with China's rapid expansion and creation of spheres of influence in Africa, I think the United States is now more careful and therefore just trying to articulate

This trade not aid relationship to the African allies and with the White House event that took place in 2025 with African nations leaders, there was a mutual understanding between the leaders and the Trump administration about how this new relationship can evolve because the African leaders, such as the president of Gabon, requested that the United States

Invest in its country.

And he specifically said that Gabon is trying to form a relationship with America, which is called the win-win partnership, where both entities win economically from that relationship.

So I think, right now, with America interacting very differently with Africa compared to the previous administration's interactions, I think we will see a lot of investments flowing into Africa from the United States. And then hopefully we will see more economic development in the region.

Does transactional diplomacy benefit African governments? The transactional diplomacy that Trump administration has been pursuing? I think it will benefit the African region because in the past with the aid relationship that the African region had with the United States, it was focusing more on local communities.

But there was a lot of criticism about how transparency issues are blocking aid to reach to the communities that are most in need. And from just education to health care in Africa.

So I think with this new transactional relationship, there will be more progress towards achieving transparency in Africa, because the investment, the investors will come with precautions, and they will articulate that the investment they're making should be used efficiently by the African governments.

So I think there will be a lot of risk management and also a lot of overseeing how projects evolve in Africa. So it will benefit the African countries' economies very deeply, and we will see some economic development, I think, happening in countries that are most in need.

But of course, we can't say for sure that how much the investment will be and how and what entities will be interested in expanding their operations in Africa.

Because as we talked in the beginning of the podcast, some American oil companies left Africa because of the reserve depletion issue some countries were so right now the comeback of those countries might be possible because I think there is still potential for oil exploration in Africa but it will depend on how oil companies will interact with the Trump

Administration and what kind of reservations they will be asking before making an investment because we see that now with the Venezuelan transition companies who left the country are trying to go back to the country with the blessing of the Trump administration so I think we might see similar oil companies going back to Africa and pursue exploration and

Potentially invest in Africa's infrastructure.

So the in one of your most recent pieces or a piece you are quoted in I can't remember off the top of my head you talked about Chevron's discovery in Angola and how it's not a sign that you know Angola is done with the worst of its crisis so talk us through that.

So Angola is a country that is also experiencing the issue of total decline in oil production but with the new discovery by Chevron there was a huge hope that the Angola's mature fields will come back to revitalization so but we need to approach this discovery very cautiously because Angola still has a much bigger problem like after reaching its peak

Production in 2008 the country has experienced nearly two decades of falling oil output as its major fields have matured so when we look at Angola's history the oil revenues were used to boost public spending reward political elites and strengthen internal security institutions and this is especially pertinent to the administration of President José Eduardo

Dos Santos and then after the political transition Angola was experiencing the total decline issue and the new president has actually experienced backlash and also protests in the country as well so Angola is a case that is interesting because it used to have very large potential for oil and discoveries and now share with the world's discovery is actually

Giving some sort of hope both for the administration in Angola and also for the people of Angola so it's when we look at local news the discoveries as perceived as very historical and important but again we need to be very cautious because and this just doesn't apply to Angola by itself plus countries can't remain dependent on oil forever because oil takes

Millions of millions of years to form so the depletion of much reserves are more likely in the future so I think the administration in Luanda should use this period of terminal decline to pursue economic diversification and prepare for a future in which oil will no longer be a significant component of government revenues and Angola isn't the only country

That has to prepare for such a feature Equatorial Guinea also had to prepare for such a future because its oil output declined and once you know that feature happened Exxon left right Exxon Mobil the American oil giant they left and it seemed that Washington was about to lose interest in Equatorial Guinea but then China stepped in and seemed like it was

Going to build a military base but then the US came back in immediately to try and counter that walk us through that Equatorial Guinea is a very interesting case because after independence and the current president came to power in 1979 the Equatorial Guinean government didn't have any sort of support from international oil companies and oil companies only

Came to the country for investments during the mid 90s and that really helped the government to stabilize the economy boost public spending and also strengthen its internal security services and then when the general dictatorship came in 2009 happened and Exxon Mobil left I think that was a huge blow for the administration so I think right now what we are

Seeing is that Equatorial Guinea would have to make a decision because the military base that China is envisioning to build is really an important development and it will be against the US national security interests so I think if Equatorial Guinea agrees with China's plan for the military base I think it's may lose Washington interest and also even

Potentially receive sanctions from the US as well because China's building of a military base would mean that China is expanding its presence in Africa and also will have access to a state through the base so I think this development is very important for Equatorial Guinea and it will make the current administration to make a choice between the United States

And China but if it pursues China to be its ally then we won't see American investments pouring into the country because investors would be hesitant about investing in a country that is very close with China but when we look at Equatorial Guinea's clean energy potential I think in the future we will see more clean energy projects developing inside the

Country and China will be an important investor in these projects.

All right China's plans have been very clear since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative it is very clear that China is desperately trying to increase its influence not just within Africa but throughout much of the global south.

So this is something that is definitely going to be worth watching over the next few years as countries are placed in the hot seat and they have to choose either Washington or Beijing so whatever happens next it's going to be very interesting to see. I think so too.

All right so a final final question Yagiz what do you think Africa will look like in the next 15 years actually in the next 20 years yeah let's let's do a nice round number.

I think in the next 15 to 20 years we will see African countries transitioning more to clean energy and also decarbonization because like right now we see we have Cam Cameroon Angola Equatorial Guinea and Gabon experiencing total decline but more countries will enter into this phase soon because oil fields are maturing and without new explorations the

Production will eventually decline so in the next 15 to 20 years I think Africa will be a region with investments from Western nations on its clean energy potential and also the critical minerals component as well I think Africa will start producing even more producing and processing even more critical minerals that are really important for the steel

Industry and for the batteries so I think in the next 15 to 20 years we will see more engagement with Western nations from the African leaders and some countries may be more aligned with China some countries may be more aligned with the US I think that will be their own strategic interests but the competition between China and the United States and Africa

Will escalate even more and therefore countries would seek their interests and make a decision whether to engage with Beijing or with Washington all right and on that note I think we're going to end the podcast here because we are slightly over time I had promised you I guess we'd do this for about an hour and as usual whenever I get to talking with someone

I find extremely interesting we go over the time but just of keeping my promise to you I guess we're going to end the conversation here but a final note for me on clean energy and the importance of African nations transitioning to clean energy I live in Kenya where all of our electricity well most of it actually I can't say all with a hundred percent

Certainty most of it comes from either hydroelectric power or geothermal energy and we've been able to use that to great effect so I hope more countries are able to invest in their clean energy resources because that's where the future lies clean energy is the future and it's what I believe every other country should be looking at right so if Africa can

Actually take the lead in using on that will be great okay and the part that's actually our final note so Brad of course yeah I guess I would love to have you again and again you have been a wonderful guest and I will definitely be reaching out to you come back on the podcast at some point thank you so much all right now if you've listened to our podcast up

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Listeners thank you so much I'll catch you in the next one